HISTORICAL SURVEY.

By ERNST FREUND.
I. The Rule of Law and Droit Administratif.
Most American lawyers look upon Administrative Law as something new in our jurisprudence; even the name has a foreign sound and French associations. In 1885, when the late Professor Dicey of Oxford published his Law of the Constitution, he devoted one chapter to comparison of the "Rule of Law" witb "Droit Administratif." In the principal European countries the relation between the administration as represented by the Executive Power and the law as represented by the Judicial Power had been the subject of memorable constitutional struggles or controversies. In England the pretensions of the Crown to establish a sort of executive justice in the Star Chamber were defeated in 1640, and the absolute independence of the Judiciary is generally taken to have been established since the beginning of the 18th century. (Act of Settlement 1701.) In France the prerogative of the old courts to refuse or at least to 6tay thl registration of new laws was exercised to delay the reforms preceding the Revolution, and the new Regime in consequence attempted to deny the courts any power to interfere with administrative processes. In Germany, during the reactionary period of the middle of the 19th century, the Government was charged with having used administrative powers for partisan purposes, and the later liberal legislation reorganized the administration in such a way as to give effect to the principles of what the Germans call the "Rechtsstaat" creating, where private rights were involved, checks of substantially judicial impartiality and independence. Both in France and in Germany the result was the establishment of a distinctive system of administrative law which did not exist in the same sense in England.
In America the judicial supremacy over the administration was unquestioned. True, Marshall held that under the Constitution the Supreme Court could not be vested with original jurisdiction in mandamus, but it will be remembered that in making this decision he asserted the far greater judicial power to declare laws unconstitutional (Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cr. 137). The power to mandamus heads of departments was eventually recognized as residing in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia (Kendall v. U. S., 12 Peters 524), and the same decision clearly stated the principle that executive instructions to officials cannot control the action of the courts in issuing writs to these officials.
Of these fundamental constitutional relations Mr. Dicey has little to say. He elaborates the contrast between the common law right to sue an officer by reason of his official acts with the immunities which a French official may claim under similar circumstances.
It is remarkable that Mr. Dicey should have selected this approach to establish a superiority of AngloAmerican over the French or Continental Law. In doing so he ignores-two common law immunities unknown to the French and to the civil law in general: the immunity of the sovereign (crown or state) from suit which in this country has been grudgingly and partially surrendered, and the absolute immunity of judges from liability to which we adhere and which the Supreme Court regards as a principle so deep seated in our system that it held the contrary rule of the Code of* the Philippines tacitly superseded by that country coming under the American flag-immunities which seriously curtail the Rule of Law (Alzua & Johnson, 231 U. S. 106). Moreover, in emphasizing the common law right to sue the officer for damages Mr. Dicey could hardly have thought of the substantive relief thereby afforded to the individual, for it is obvious that the financial responsibility of those officials whose relations to individuals are of a nature to give use to tort liability is apt to be slight, so that in the absence of bondsmen it will not be worth while to sue. He must have had in mind the formal side of the relief as affording an opportunity for correcting administrative error or illegality.
It is true that both under the English law and our own, a suit for damages against an officer may be used to test the legality of governmental acts, and that thus principles of administrative (as well as of constitutional) law, may be developed, so to speak, as a by-product of common law jurisdiction. The federal -11 -.
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revenue administration furnishes a striking illustration in point. Important questions of income tax law are settled in suits on implied contract against internal revenue collectors, and only last year the Supreme Court held that after the death of the collector the suit has to be brought against his estate and not against his successor in office. (Smietanka v. Illinois Steel Co., 257 U. S. 1.) So tariff controversies formerly took the form of actions in trover or assumpsit against the collector of customs, which used to be brought in the state courts and were then by removal transferred to the federal courts. (Tracy v. Swartwout, 10 Pet. 80; Elliott v. Swartwout, 10 Pet. 137.) In the customs administration certain difficulties connected with the suit against the collector of customs eventually led to the substitution of a statutory appeal decided in the last resort by a court of customs appeals. While the federal courts for some reason have never been permitted to control administrative officials by mandamus or certiorari, these writs have been used both in England and in the American States to supplement and partly supersede the common law action against officials. These writs manifest their extraordinary character by not being available in every court, by not being matter of absolute right, and by taking the form of actions brought in the name of the State or People as formal complaining party. It thus appears that the course of development has been to displace or push back the purely common law remedy, and to build up forms of relief which, while not organized into an entirely separate jurisdiction as in France or Germany, yet likewise constitute a special body of administrative law.
Whether looked at from the point of view of the individual or from that of the official the correction of administrative errors through an action for damages against the person of the officer is an unsatisfactory contrivance, which, with the development of sound principles of liability is bound to disappear in course of time.
The common law had clear theories regarding claims for damages where the officer acted in a purely ministerial as well* as where he acted in a purely judicial capacity. The ministerial officer who acted under a judicial warrant was exempt from liability where the warrant was fair on its face; the judicial officer was exempted from liability, if a judge of a superior court, so long as he acted under color of jurisdiction, if a judge of an inferior court, so long as he did not overstep his actual jurisdiction. Ministerial power thus meant a power to rely upon orders, judicial power meant a power to err.
But as to error committed in the exercise of powers neither clearly judicial nor clearly ministerial, the common law either had no clear theory or tended constantly to draw away from such theories as it had. The question was how to deal with bona fide error commited by licensing officials, assessors, election or returning officers, highway authorities or boards of health, officials who did not claim to be courts, and yet did not act under the sanction of a judicial warrant.
-13---A doctrine was attemped to be built up on the differentiation between discretionary and non-discretionary powers, the latter being termed ministerial though by no means comparable to the power of the sheriff who had a judicial writ to protect him. The licensing officer was held to exercise discretionary power, while most other administrative officers were supposed to act ministerially. For error in the exercise of discretion there was no liability, the immunity being like that of the justice of the peace; but the ministerial power was by a fiction of law treated as clear, so that error involved liability. The rule was so unjust that a further differentiation had to be made between ministerial powers according as they involved mere inaction, or as they resulted in positive invasion of personal and property rights. (Seaman v. Patten, 2 Caines, 312; McCord v. High, 24 Ia., 336.) The type of the ministerial power resulting in mere inaction was the refusal of an election officer to receive a vote or make an appropriate return. The English law first pronounced in favor of liability in the famous case of Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938, which is supposed to illustrate the maxim that where there is a right there is a remedy, but later drew back from this position, and denied liability in the absence of malice. Drewe v. Coulton, 1 East 563n. In America, the doctrine of liability of election officers was asserted by Massachusetts (Lincoln v. Hapgood, 11 Mass. 350 York held trespass to be inadmissible against the officer making an erroneous assessment, remitting the aggrieved tax payer to other remedies. Easton v. Calendar, 11 Wend. 90. It was, however, under the law of New York that the liability of customs officers erroneously classifying merchandise under tariff schedules was first enforced; but here it was a matter of form simply, since the government indemnified the official, and, as stated before, the action against the officer was eventually superseded by an administrative appeal. Clearly the development of the theory of liability was such as to make it of little avail for purposes of correction of administrative error.
The difference between Anglo-American and French or Continental Law thus diminishes as we scrutinize our own laws more closely. In all modern countries the tendency is to allow administrative acts and decisions, so far as they touch matter of private right, to be reviewed under the safeguards of sub-stantially judicial impartiality. The theory of our law is that the administration is in principle within the rule and nexus of the common law, while the French theory is that the law which binds the administration is a special and distinct law. The difference appears to assume a practical aspect in the organization of distinctive administrative courts in France and Germany; but these do not exist in Belgium, and in the United States the Court of Claims and the Court of Custom Appeals might be designated as administrative courts. The truth is that the purely formal side of administrative law is so beset with technicality and obscurity that it does not lend itself to profitable generalization.
Or rather, any one undertaking too arouse the interest of a legal audience in the subject should do it as part of a systematic attempt to place both administrative law remedies and the entire law of public liability upon a modernized basis. But the time is hardly ripe for such a reform.
II. The Growth of Administrative Power.
If the American lawyer takes an increasing interest in Administrative Law it is because he associates it with the fact that he has more and more occasion to attend to the interests of his clients in government departments and before commissions which claim to administer law without pretending to be courts of justice.
What is it that distinguishes administrative action from judicial action? It is that judicial action presup- poses some controversy or alleged wrong or delinquency, whereas administrative action operates as an incident in the normal course of affairs. Many persons go through life without getting into courts of justice; few can avoid contact with administrative authorities.
There is a type of social habit which abhors all official intervention in private affairs. This manifests itself in a constitution of law and government which confines public functions as far as possible to the exercise of judicial power. England down to the nineteenth century furnishes the classical example of this type. The rights of person and property were secured practically without resort to administrative arrangements, and the law developed a number of peculiar customs, doctrines and contrivances by which the propertied classes shielded their affairs from the light of publicity and official intermeddling. In like manner English legislation sought to regulate internal police with a minimum of bureaucratic control. There were practically no central departments supervising or restraining social or industrial activities; there was no prefectoral system of local government, but a judicially organized county magistracy issued orders in the form of convictions and undertook to promote the public welfare by enforcing penalties, being in its turn checked by the supervisory jurisdiction of the King's Courts. There was not even until recently an official machinery for the prosecution of crime. Where some new function of government control was called for, for which the existing organization appeared inade-
quate, it was entrusted by preference to judicially organized commissions, which had the status of courts of record. But such new functions were sparingly created, and the older acts of Parliament for the regulation of various branches of trade and manufacture were allowed to fall into practical disuse and for the most part were abrogated by a series of acts passed in the reigns of George III. and Queen Victoria. The so-called industrial revolution was allowed to proceed without let or hindrance from law or legislation, and when modern inventions and improvements called into life great quasi-public undertakings which demanded special privileges and therefore could not be allowed to establish themselves without public authority and control, Parliament preferred to keep that control in its own hands, devising for the purpose an elaborate system of private bill legislation which has only within the last few years shown signs of giving way to administrative control. Ever since the days of Parliamentary reform, however, the English dislike of the bureaucratic type of government has had to give way to modern methods of administration under the insistent pressure of urgent social problems. First the reform of the poor law, then the systematic legislation for public sanitation, and finally the factory laws and other laws for the benefit of the working classes, provided for direct supervision and co-operation by central departments, and the Home Office and Local Government Board (now the Ministry of Health) established the bureaucratic type of administration as part of the government of England. In America the growth of administrative power did not encounter the same temperamental opposition that it did in England, but it was checked by the distribution of powers peculiar to our constitutional system. The highly concentrated form of the federal administrative organization was for a long time not used for the exercise of governmental power over individuals; it was not until the last part of the nineteenth century that Congress began to use its interstate commerce powers for regulative purposes. In the states the bulk of legislation was locally administered without central supervision; and it was only by slow degrees and imperfectly, that a state administrative organization with controlling powers over private interests was built up. The result has been that while we have probably been less conservative than England in the enactment of regulative legislation, we still have on the whole even less of the bureaucratic type of administrative control.
The nineteenth century inevitably witnessed an enormous expansion of regulative legislation. What is remarkable is not that the use of formerly unknown mechanical forces and new discoveries in the fields of disease and sanitation should have resulted in corresponding health and safety legislation, but that the great enlargement of the scale of business operations should have been permitted to proceed on the whole with so little attempt at legislative standardization. Less reluctant to interfere than England, America has generally speaking likewise pursued a policy of laissez faire with regard to the management of economic in- terests. The one field in which American legislation has pressed control in an unconservative if not reckless spirit has been in the license requirements for the right to engage in skilled trades or independent middlemen's services; here we have the unfortunate combination of administrative power with imperfect legislative standardization; but it should be observed that this legislation has been enacted in deference to the demands of the interests, affected and not in response to any public demand.
Most of those who are beyond middle life have been educated to regard neutrality with reference to business as the orthodox and desirable attitude of the state. The theory which that attitude reflects was probably well suited to a period of profound economic transformation which could have been directed by law neither successfully nor intelligently. Now the lines of that transformation have become tolerably clear, and since one of the outstanding features of the new organization of business is the service of large numbers of persons by particular concerns, standardization of methods is almost inevitable, and it is perhaps equally inevitable that this standardization should in course of time express itself in law. The tendency in other words seems to be toward legislative regulation of economic activity.
III. Ministerial and Discretionary Powers.
Conceding or assuming this, the student of Administrative Law is greatly concerned with the question what this legislation will mean in terms of administra- tive power, and whether it is possible at the present time to note tendencies or to pronounce judgment upon policies.
Administrative power is not at present bestowed for its own sake. If it is difficult to get rid of any salary paying office, it is even more difficult to induce the average legislature to create one. Fee offices have been almost universally abrogated; indeed the dislike of them caused in New York in 1846 a constitutional prohibition of all inspection offices which has been carried into subsequent constitutions of that State.
Administrative power is defensible and desirable if it greatly aids the purposes of legislative regulation. Whether the ordinary machinery of criminal prosecution satisfies legitimate needs or not, can only be judged from subject to subject, and generalization would be hazardous.
If administrative power seems to be called for, the choice lies between power which merely sees to the observance of the law, and power which is intended to give definiteness to an indefinite law, i. e. between ministerial and discretionary power. The ministerial power again may be a mere power of inspection, followed, if necessary by the initiation of a criminal prosecution, or it may be a ministerial approving or licensing power. The latter is of course a power of higher grade, for it is a power to pass upon and determine private rights. It is in the nature of an advance check, and presupposes that there exists a condition which has inherent guaranties of duration; it also presupposes that the necessary machinery of ap- proval will not unduly impede the normal conduct of business operations. If this form of power is impracticable, the administrative check will be by way of mere inspection. The power of inspection, particularly if it is also a power to pass or reject, may be a source of abuse or corruption. This is entirely at matter of administrative organization and morale, and fortunately modern political organization has greatly advanced in honesty and efficiency beyond what was formerly thought possible or beyond what is today possible in back-ward communities. Factory inspection in England and in Germany attained very high standards in the course of the last century; bank examination has a good repute in the federal government and also in many states; it is more difficult to speak of the character of sanitary and building inspection which is locally organized and varies accordingly. And if inspection technique and morale are sufficiently highly developed, there is perhaps no objection in principle, where the nature of the case permits it, to raise the power of inspection to a power of approval. It becomes then mainly a question whether it is possible so to specify and define statutory requirements as to eliminate discretion. If that can be done the power to approve becomes a duty to approve, and legislative formulas can readily be devised to minimize the danger of abuse by way of official chicanery or procrastination.
What we cannot say of administrative power in general we can say of discretionary administrative power over individual rights, namely that it is undesirable per se and should be avoided as far as may be, for discretion is unstandardized power and to lodge in an official such power over person or property is hardly conformable to the "Rule of Law."
Is it then possible to establish in our administrative statutes a tendency toward the elimination of discretion? I believe such a tendency may be predicated for England, and it is certain that a deliberate legislative policy in that direction was adopted in Germany during the liberal era following the war of 1866. It is much more difficult to speak of our own legislation. The New York excise tax law of 1896 was a conspicuous, if solitary, instance of the conscious substitution of purely ministerial certification for discretionary license, particularly remarkable because it occurred in a subject that traditionally has been regarded as the most appropriate domain of discretion. But generally speaking our legislation is fluctuating, and in notable cases, e. g. that of the regulation of the banking business, New York has emphasized discretionary power. Notwithstanding this I am inclined to think that even in New York the gradual and rather unconscious drift is toward displacement of discretion. I do not overlook the new advent of the unstandardized power over capital issues and the certificates of convenience and necessity; but the importance of these matters will force standardization in a relatively short time.
Where the law operates with licensing powers it has always the choice of substituting for discretion a definite standard to be ministerially applied. But where it resorts to order-issuing powers vested in adminis-
trative authorities, discretion is of the very essence of the function; for there would be no sense in a ministerial duty to issue an order; the law might as well create the duty without administrative intervention.
Seeing then that the most important point in the development of administrative law is the reduction of discretion, the recent creation of public utility commissions with incisive order-issuing powers must arrest attention and it is no wonder that the interest of lawyers has been concentrated on this phase of administrative laws.
IV. Commission Powers and Public Utilities.
In studying the legislative history of the manifold undertakings which make an appeal for public recognition in the way of privilege or otherwise, and which may be conveniently designated by the terms: public utilities and finance, it is necessary to start with the Royal Prerogative in England. In course of time it became well established that the King had power to grant charters of incorporation, but that the enjoyment of anything in the nature of a monopoly, and the exercise of the right of eminent domain (1 Blac. Comm. 139) required parliamentary sanction. The prerogative to grant charters of incorporation is important for its converse aspect that corporate existence is not a matter of common right but requires a sovereign act of recognition. In this country the legislature became the successor both to the powers of Parliament (subject to constitutional limitations) and to the Royal prerogative, with the consequence that every enter-prise or organization of more than ordinary magnitude was dependent upon legislative authorization. For a long time this authorization was granted in the form of special acts, which were passed under the same procedure as general statutes. Nothing like the highly standardized methods of English private bill legislation, costly, but securing impartiality and the observance of definite principles, was ever introduced into American practice, and there was nothing consequently to prevent the suspicion of abuse or its occasional occurrence. When the people of Ohio formed their first constitution in 1802 they inserted a clause that every regularly formed association should be entitled to letters of incorporation from the legislature, a provision apparently intended primarily for educational institutions; it did not occur to the framers of the instrument that the way to accomplish their object was the enactment of a general incorporation law. After the Dartmouth College decision it became usual to reserve in the act of incorporation a power to amend and repeal, and in some states legislative committees began to inquire into abuses of charter powers, and to exercise a rudimentary sort of supervision over corporations. Massachusetts furnishes an interesting illustration of this type of control.
It is quite clear that the system of special legislation as practiced in America did not lend itself to purposes of effective control, and gradually it became superseded by general incorporation laws, separately enacted for different classes of enterprise, social and economic.
The climax of this development was reached when in 1849 New York threw open the right to incorporate for the purpose of building and operating railroads with the incidental right of condemnation of private property, without reserving any veto power to any organ of the state. Some of these incorporation laws at the same time contained full regulative provisions, and the standards laid down by the laws of New York for banking and insurance have on the whole been found adequate for the protection of the public, with mere supervisory and enforcing powers vested in appropriate administrative authorities, although New York has drifted again into a policy of wide administrative discretion.
To standardize the essentials of railroad management and service was a much more difficult matter, and the earlier statutory principles were vague and to a large extent proved practically inoperative. It is true that under the regime of freedom the American railroad system expanded like no other in the world, but abuses were inevitable and made an increasing impression upon the public mind.
After a regime of special incorporation laws, and after a second regime of general statutory regulation, there began after the Civil War a third regime of administrative control, which by gradual stages became an accepted part of American Law. Massachusetts in 1869 created a railroad commission which was vested with no mandatory powers except in the matter of securing publicity, but which nevertheless achieved considerable success, owing mainly to the high character and great authority of its first Presi-dent, Charles Francis Adams. Illinois in 1873 directed a railroad commission to prepare passenger and freight rate schedules which were to be received in court as prima facie evidence of reasonable rates. The necessity of constructing comprehensive schedules and their qualified force induced a conservative exercise of the power, and of the early so-called Granger laws that of Illinois alone survived. In 1887 came the Interstate Commerce Act, wfilch created administrative powers of a different type but which under judicial construction turned out not to be fully effective instruments of control. Two lines of decisions illustrate the judicial attitude: the commission was to entertain complaints as to rates, and, when found unreasonable, to order the railroad company to desist; the Supreme Court held that the order to desist had to be purely negative and could not be turned into an order prescribing a definite lower rate. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cinc., N. 0. & Tex. P. R. Co., 167 U. S. 479, 1897. The act provided that commission orders were to be enforced by the courts; the Supreme Court held that the court, when called upon to enforce, had to consider the entire case de novo, though required to accept the findings of the Commission as prima facie evidence. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama Railroad R. Co., 168 U. S. 144, 1897. It is needless to inquire whether an unduly narrow interpretation was placed upon the law; it is certain that the terms of the law made that interpretation possible, and these terms had not been inadvisedly chosen. The result was that under the act as first drawn the -27-Interstate Commerce Commission had no effective power over rates. It was then proposed to strengthen the law by placing commission rates beyond judicial review. A great constitutional debate arose in Congress as to the limitations that might be placed upon the judicial power, and the Rate Act of 1906 gave to the question an oracular answer. It provided that if any carrier fails to obey an order, the commission should apply to a court for enforcement, the court to prosecute such inquiries as it may deem needful in the ascertainment of the facts of issue. "If upon such hearing as the court may determine to be necessary it appears that the order was regularly made and duly served, and that the carrier is in disobedience of the same, the court shall enforce obedience to such order . . ." "Order regularly made and duly served" seems to mean an order correct in its formel aspects; but if an order must be enforced if formally correct, why should the court be given power to prosecute inquiries and investigations?
The provision is so ambiguous that it is in practice not used, all judicial reviews being had under proceedings in equity to restrain the commission, which the Act of 1906 incidentally recognizes in two places. The act indicates no basis of review but the Supreme Court has declared that review will be confined to questions of constitutionality, law and of reasonableness. Interstate Commerce Commission v. I. C. R. Co., 215 U. S. 452, 1909. Subsequent acts of Congress, relating to other phases of economic control, are somewhat more expli- If this means that the administrative finding must be supported by the evidence as a whole, the theory of review is different from that of Trade Commission cases, in which the findings must be merely supported by evidence (I. e. by some evidence).
In the Tariff Act of 1922 the same section (see. 316) dealing with unfair practices commonly designated as dumping, makes in one place the findings of the Tariff Commission conclusive if supported by evidence, in another if supported by the evidence. I am told by the draftsman of the act that the "the" is a clerical mistake, and it may be that the Supreme Court will remove the apparent contradiction by construction.
I shall recur to this matter presently. It will be noted from this history that Congress has devised certain legislative formulas of Vesting and at the same time qualifying administrative powers to regulate or determine the validity of business practices.
In the meantime, also, state after state established commissions to control railroads and other public utilities, generally cast upon similar types, and it is particularly interesting that Massachusetts in 1913 abandoned the non-compulsory policy of 1869 and -29-created a commission with the now usual mandatory powers. The Trade Commission Act has not been generally copied in the states. A number of states have attempted to supervise the issue and sale of securities; but the technique of these so-called "blue sky" laws does not appear to have been definitely settled; that of Illinois dispenses entirely with administrative powers.
The Trade Commission Act of 1914 had grown out of the Anti-Trust Act of 1890. The relative failure of that act had been due to the indefiniteness of its prohibitions, and while the Act of 1914 introduced a new uncertainty in the term "unfair methods of competition" it sought to remove the difficulty, experienced in the application of the Anti-Trust Act by the device of an administrative prohibition of specific practices, such practices to be penalized only after the prohibition had been issued and, upon resistance, judicially confirmed. The Packers Act and the Dumping clause of the Tariff Act dealt with particular phases of unfair trading in the same manner.
The novel features of all these acts consisted in the creation of administrative powers of enforcing economic policies through orders issued against particular concerns and practices. Such orders present a special problem. Ordinarily an administrative authority will not issue a particular order except upon the basis of some complaint. Where the object of the administrative power is the protection of health or safety, the regular routine of inspection, whether on the inspector's own initiative or invited by private information, will result in the requisite complaints and the proceeding may thus retain an entirely official character. Where, however, the object is an economic one, the complaint or petition for an order is likely to originate with some party adversely interested and there is thus the danger that the public authority may appear to be placed in the service of one of two ad. verse or competing economic interests.
It is clear then how important it is that the interL ests which the order seeks to enforce are in reality public interests, how important it is in other words that it should be possible to define these interests satisfactorily by reference to some clear legal standard. The difficulty hardly exists in safety or sanitary legislation where abuse of public power for the furtherance of private interests, if not impossible, is at least easily recognizable as an abuse. The difficulty is a very real one in economic legislation. Consider the terms with which this legislation operates: fraud, discrimination, monopoly, price control, unreasonable charge, inadequate service; and you will recognize the gradation from common legal certainty to utter indefiniteness. The more indefinite the standard, the greater is obviously the temptation to use the law as a weapon to gain economic advantage, using the public interest as a shield. At best the consumer, the passenger, the shipper, the wage earner, the "small man" in general, will frankly and sincerely claim that his interest is identical with the public welfare. Legislation operating with such indefinite concepts as discrimination, monopoly, or unreasonableness is based upon the feel--31 -ing that the clearly established common law category of fraud is inadequate to check undesirable practices and that additional grounds of restraint should be established. This feeling in itself constitutes a bias which inevitably communicates itself to a policy-enforcing authority, while a court of justice, partly as a matter of tradition, and partly as a matter of reaction, is not unlikely to stand for a more conservative theory of the relation between public power and private right.
The theory of the relation of the courts to the findings of administrative commissions thus becomes a matter of much importance. The undisputed judicial power to correct errors of law operates with particular effectiveness where the term used by the statute lends itself to a definite conservative interpretation. Thus "unfair methods of competition" will be defined to mean commonly reprobated practices or practices involving some element of deception; it is doubtful whether even such a matter as the issue of trading stamps could be successfully attacked otherwise than by direct legislation. The difficulty is enhanced by the peculiar character of administrative findings of fact. The dispute usually does not turn upon the truth or falsity of the facts established by the commission, but upon the truth or falsity of its conclusions, i. e. either the completeness of the facts to serve as a basis of judgment, or their interpretation and effect. These conclusions must in the nature of things be largely matter of opinion, and the difference between law and fact becomes obscure. A bias, even an unconscious bias, may determine which way the decision will fall. How far under these circumstances is private right protected under a fact finding power of an administrative commission? And to what extent is the finding subject to judicial review?
There is a curious uncertainty about the status of a commission which combines the functions of prosecutor and judge and thus seems to violate the principle of separation of powers, a principle, it is true, incapable of being applied with absolute perfection in the practical affairs of government, yet ever striving for realization in the modern state and almost fully carried out in the constitution of the judiciary. It is perhaps owing to the feeling that the double-faced commission is an anomaly that Congress in the Packers Act committed functions analogous to those of the Federal Trade Commission to the Secretary of Agriculture, a high executive official who of necessity must act through a bureaucratic staff.
By setting up the double check of full procedural safeguards and subjection to judicial review, the framers of the act apparently believed that it was possible to meet and neutralize certain tendencies inherent in the exercise of bureaucratic power, or at least to reduce the action of the department to the status of a mere preliminary inquiry.
In the famous Arlidge case decided in 1915 (Local Government Board v. Arlidge 1915, A. C. 120) , the British House of Lords, reversing the Court of Appeal, sustained an administrative order issued in part upon the basis of an official report which was not laid open to the examination of the owner whose property -33 -was condemned. Bureaucratic administration, the House of Lords said, meant confidential relations between chief and subordinate, and Parliament in giving a government department quasi judicial powers must have contemplated this departure from common law procedural principles. Thirty years ago the Federal Courts took a similar view of semi-secret methods employed in the customs administration on the theory that the government's sources of information would be jeopardized if they were divulged in a judicial proceeding, and they were sustained by the Supreme Court. Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U. S. 310, 1890; Origet v. Hedden, 155 U. S. 228, 1894. But in this branch of administration the pressure of the powerful interests involved, reinforced by the remonstrations of foreign governments, gradually brought about a modification of the government's attitude, and eventually the principle of secrecy, at one time declared essential to the public interest, was abandoned, and the Underwood Tariff Act of 1913 made the procedure before the Board of General Appraisers like that of a regular event of justice. It is in the light of this history that we should appreciate the express provision of the Packers Act to the effect that all the evidence must be laid before the parties investigated and that they are to have the right of cross examination. As regards judicial review, the obscurity of the Rate Act of 1906 should be contrasted with the explicit provisions of the acts of 1914, 1921, and 1922 . But these acts, while explicit, apparently fluctuate between two theories of review indicated by the subtle difference be--34-tween saying that on judicial enforcement the administrative findings of fact are conclusive, either if supported by the evidence, or if supported by evidence. The former phrasing seems to make the entire matter of conclusions, i. e. the essential part of the findings, subject to review; the latter would seem to reduce the judicial power to the correction of an abuse of discretion, or what the courts treat as an error of law.
But in the very recent decision of the Curtis Publishing Company case (January 8, 1923) the Supreme Court under the narrower power of the Federal Trade Commission Act reviewed substantially as though the wider power of review had been granted. The chief justice and Justice Brandeis "doubted," but did not dissent. Courts may generally be relied upon to interpret statutory provisions in such a manner that reviewing powers which they deem essential to private right are not unduly curtailed, and they are apt to ignore refinements of drafting which appear to stand in the way of their power.
It is doubtful whether at present any machinery can be devised more effective for the protection of private interests than the combination of adequately safeguarded administrative procedure and of judicial review, such as results from the recent legislation of Congress.
We should bear in mind that underlying these difficulties of administrative procedure is the attempt to answer perplexing questions of economic policy by the method of trial from case to case with which we are familiar in the upbuilding of the common law and the ,definition of due process. It seems to be believed that by a combination of administrative and judicial action it will be possible to evolve a code of fair trading; perhaps it can be done in part, but it is not likely that highly controverted issues will be ultimately settled otherwise than by direct legislative action. It seems also to be believed that the like methods can settle the perpetual contest for profit and advantage which lies at the foundation of our entire economic constitution, the assumption being that there are standards of equity which should control the quid pro quo in service and return, at least as applied to undertakings affected with a public interest, perhaps even as applied to labor and its wages, and which can be discovered by patient and impartial experimentation.
It is interesting to trace the legislative dealing with this difficulty as applied to railroad rates. Unreasonable rates are forbidden by the Interstate Commerce Act and may be proceeded against by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The proceeding is quasi judicial, and the Commission must show unreasonableness before it can prohibit a rate and substitute another. The Commission could not do, what many state legislatures did in 1907, namely substitute a 2 cent passenger fare for a 21/ or 3 cent fare, merely on the assumption that the lower rate would not prove confiscatory. The determination that a rate is unreasonable depends upon a multitude of complex factors which normally the owner will understand better and be able to present more effectively than a public authority. In a rate contest, therefore the advantage, by reason of primary control and difficulty of adverse proof, lies with the carrier. Legislation has tried to offset this advantage by shifting the burden of proof, whenever it is proposed to increase a rate. This was done in the United States in 1910 (Act, Sec. 15 (7)); England had done the same thing in 1894.
As against a public authority which is poorly equipped for obtaining the requisite information, the shifting of the burden of proof may be legitimate enough, and may not even neutralize entirely the advantage which the carrier has in establishing his case. But where the public authority is organized with so elaborate a machinery of supervision as the Interstate Commerce Commission, the position with reference to obtaining data for judgment is very much equalized, and complex factors being marshalled against complex factors with equal competence and skill, the burden of proof may be impossible to meet. The Five per cent case of 1914 illustrates the difficulty and the dilemma. Against the public contention that the law must not make it unduly difficult to prove unreasonableness, we must now set the owner's contention that he should not be required to make that a matter of legal demonstration which is essentially a matter of business judgment. Is it a tenable theory of the relation between government and business which leaves to the owner all risk and responsibility, and permits an administrative authority to say: "prove your case, or we will not allow you to act"?
Certainly neither in the United States nor in England would it be possible to make a strong case for the new theory of control by the fruits it has borne. If rate regulation was unsatisfactory with an impossible burden of proof placed upon the public authorities, has it been any less unsatisfactory with an impossible burden of proof thrown upon the carriers? In either case there was the same difficulty, the difficulty of setting up legal control without the starting point of some principle or standard to be applied in administering the law.
What has happened? Both in the United States and in England the most recent legislation has endeavored to remedy this fundamental difficulty by establishing a statutory rate of return, a "standard revenue," which will place the question of reasonableness at least to some extent beyond mere guess work, and to that extent will standardize what was before unstandardized administrative control. The history of rate regulation shows that our estimate of administrative powers must take into account considerations that go beyond organization, procedure, and judicial review. There will always be the fundamental question of the standards underlying the exercise of power. If the legislature has no standards of its own, may it commit the working out of standards to the administration? With regard to some matters, or as a temporary policy, that may be legitimate enough. But if the legislature asks the administration to evolve standards in matters which cannot as yet be scientifically or legally standardized, or prescribes an intrinsically erroneously or unworkable standard, no skill in devising procedural safeguards will produce just or beneficial re-suits, and the body called upon to exercise the power will find it hard to win or retain confidence whether it be a commission or whether it be a court; perhaps it may then even be an advantage if the body has not the claim or semblance of judicial impartiality, but is avowedly an instrument of policy like the legislature itself.
In England the rate determining body, though called a commission, was in all essential respects constituted like a court; but the difficulties of its task were the same as those that confronted the administrative commission in this country; and in 1921 the rate determining function was transferred to what, though now called a rates tribunal, is constituted in essential respects like a commission and not like a court.
The American people seem to be as inclined as any other to stake their faith on legislation as a cure for economic or social evils or dangers; they are also satisfied to bestow administrative power as a supplement to legislation, and if they have not as yet either an adequate technique of administrative procedure or of judicial review or of public responsibility, that development may perhaps with confidence be left to the future.
But if administrative power is used for the purpose of experimenting with problems not as yet solved and perhaps for the present unsoluble, we must be prepared to take the consequences. We must not expect that unstandardized power can easily be harmonized with traditional notions of judicial authority. A clear Rudolf Gneist, who in his day exercised a great influence upon Administrative Law in Germany, propounded the theory that the political state exists in order to combat, and according to the measure of its power and wisdom to neutralize, the selfish forces working in society. Perhaps it would come nearer the truth to say that the political organization of the state itself is the resultant of two conflicting tendencies, the desire for power which inspires policy, and the desire for justice which inspires law. The key to the understanding of most political institutions must be found in this their compromise nature.
If this is so we shall not look in our administrative law for consistency or conformity to any one theory. Considering that a good deal of this law has grown up and still lives in great obscurity, fashioned by the very occasional and sporadic reflections of judges who rarely saw more than one particular angle of the subject, we are entitled to criticize and condemn where we find maladjustment and anachronism in our unwritten administrative law.
It is a different matter when we consider a deliberate course of legislation, which seems to represent a national and world wide tendency. Not that we therefore need to consider it as wise or perfect; but the presumption is that it responds to some demand of the time, and that it is inevitable, and temporarily at least legitimate. We may believe a policy unsound in -40-the long run, and yet be persuaded that it must be tried out. It is futile to denounce the extension of administrative control to economic interests. But we should carefully study its phases and qualifications, try to understand its mechanism, and appreciate differences that should have a legitimate effect upon measures and policies. It is not for the student of administrative law to offer a solution for every problem in his field; but he should help others to understand why some problems are as yet unsolved.
March 12, 1923.
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